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NOTES 
Unemployment Compensation for Employees on 
Required Vacation Without Pay 
The Social Security Act of 19351 created a federal-state system of 
unemployment compensation which permits the states to establish 
their mvn standards of qualification for unemployment benefits. All 
states have enacted statutes pursuant to this system and have estab-
lished three basic conditions which a claimant must meet before he 
is entitled to benefits.2 First, he must be unemployed. Second, he 
must remain able to work and available for work. Third, he must 
be free from disqualification for such acts as voluntarily leaving 
work without good cause attributable to the employer or employing 
unit,8 discharge for conduct connected with the work,4 or refusal of 
suitable work.0 
Since the basic purpose of these state statutes is to limit unem-
ployment compensation to those workers who are "unemployed pri-
marily as a result of economic causes,''6 the courts have generally 
limited benefits to those whose unemployment is a result of condi-
tions in the claimant's industry.7 Thus, if the employer closes his 
plant and the employee is temporarily laid off, there is sufficient 
"economic cause" for recovery to be allowed.8 A similar result is 
reached even if the temporary layoff is a customary annual occur-
rence in the industry.9 On the other hand, claimants have generally 
1. 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964). 
2. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. I.Aw § 591; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(2) (Page 1965); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 801·02 (1964). The states have also set various procedural 
standards. Thus, a claimant may be required to register for work at an employment 
office, to serve a waiting period before he becomes eligible for benefits, or occasionally 
to undergo a period of vocational retraining. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP, LAws § 421.28 
(Supp. 1961). 
3. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 421.29(l)(a) (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21•5(a) 
(1962). 
4. See, e.g., !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 223 (Smith-Hurd 1950); PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 
§ 802( e) (1964). 
5. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151A, § l(r)(2) (1957); Omo REv. Com~ ANN, 
§ 4141.29(D)(2)(b) (Page 1965). The extent of disqualification for any one of these 
three causes varies considerably among the states. Thus, the disqualification may be 
a postponement of benefits for some prescribed period, a cancellation of benefit rights, 
or a reduction of benefits otherwise payable. For a thorough comparison, see BUREAU 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE LAws 89-120 (1964). 
6. Id. at 89; S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1935); H.R, REP. No. 615, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 7 (1935). 
7. See Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W,2d 
77 (1944). 
8. See, e.g., Copper Range Co. v. Uhemployment Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mich, 
460, 31 N.W.2d 692 (1948); Claims of Spinella, 282 App. Div. 974, 125 N.Y.S,2d 853 
(1953). 
9. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Huey, 161 Tex. 500, 342 S.W,2d 544 (1961). 
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not been awarded benefits if they are on vacation. If the vacation is 
paid or partially paid by the employer, the worker is not unem-
ployed;10 if the vacation is requested by the employee, he is off work 
"voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or em-
ploying unit" and is consequently disqualified from benefits.11 How-
ever, there is one vacation situation with which the courts have had 
a great deal of difficulty-the employee who is on vacation without 
pay because of a provision in his employment contract. 
Many industrial employers prefer to have all employees take 
their vacations simultaneously so that production operations will 
not be affected by vacations staggered throughout the year. Conse-
quently, negotiations are carried out with the employees' collective 
bargaining agent for a provision in the employment contract estab-
lishing an annual period during which the plant may or must be 
closed for vacation.12 Since most employees receive vacation pay dur-
ing this period, they are not "unemployed" and are thus ineligible 
for unemployment compensation.13 However, the seniority system in 
many plants prevents employees hired within the past year from re-
ceiving any vacation pay.14 Admittedly, these employees could be 
said to be "voluntarily" off work in the sense that they accepted the 
vacation provision by agreeing to work under the contract. On the 
other hand, the agreement was probably reached by the collective 
bargaining agents before the employees with low seniority even be-
gan to work. Faced with these facts, courts have been uncertain 
whether to treat such employees like other workers who agree to a 
compulsory vacation period or to recognize that their position is 
essentially identical to that of the employee who has been tempo-
rarily laid off. 
Since the statutory provisions were apparently not drafted with 
this type of problem in mind, judicial interpretation has resulted 
in decisions which are difficult to reconcile. Furthermore, these deci-
sions have generally shown little awareness of the relevant policy 
10. Jones v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 2d 770, 
262 P .2d 91 (1953); Oglebay Norton Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Wis. 2d 396, 113 
N.W.2d 35 (1962). 
11. See, e.g., Naylor v. Shuron Optical Co., 281 App. Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S.2d 775 
(1952), afj'd mem. sub nom. In the Matter of l'laylor, 306 N.Y. 794, ll8 N.E.2d 816 
(1954); Bennett v. Hix, 139 W. Va. 75, 79 S.E.2d 114 (1953). 
12. For example, the collective bargaining agreement in Moen v. Director of the 
Div. of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 247, 85 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1949) provided 
in part: "It is understood and agreed that a period of temporary shutdown in any 
department for any reason between June 1 and October 1, unless other periods are 
mutually agreed upon, may be designated as comprising the vacation period •••• " 
13. Workers who are receiving remuneration are not unemployed, even if they are 
not working. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. 
14. The contract in Employment Security Comm'n v. Vulcan Forging Co., 375 
Mich. 374, 134 N.W.2d 749 (1965), allowed employees with ten years seniority an 
amount equal to 5% of their year's earnings during the two weeks, while employees 
with less than one year's seniority were entitled to no vacation pay. 
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considerations. Several courts have simply stated that the claimants 
were not entitled to benefits because they were not unemployed 
"within the meaning of the act."15 In so doing, however, these courts 
have completely ignored the statutory provision which stipulates 
that a worker is unemployed "during any week with respect to which 
no remuneration is payable to him."16 Thus, unless a person has an• 
other source of income, he must be considered to be unemployed 
when he is on vacation without pay. 
Other courts have recognized that the claimants were temporarily 
unemployed, but have found them ineligible for benefits, on the 
ground that they were not "able to work and available for work," 
since they planned to return to their regular employment when the 
vacation ended.17 To circumvent the fact that these employees were 
clearly willing to work, the courts have had to interpret "available 
for work" to mean available for work on a job other than the one 
to which they hope to return at the end of the vacation. This view 
has been deservedly criticized for reading improper qualifications 
into the statutory language.18 
In most of the cases, however, the courts have found that these 
workers are unemployed and available for work. Consequently, the 
basic issue has been whether an employee should be disqualified for 
having left work "voluntarily, without good cause attributable to 
the employer or employing unit,"1? if his plant closes pursuant to a 
provision in his collective bargaining agreement. 
"Good Cause" 
Although it seems clear that the claimant is to be denied benefits 
only when he has left his employment both voluntarily and without 
good cause attributable to the employer, the courts have generally 
ignored the "good cause" provision and have dealt only with the 
question whether the unemployment is voluntary.20 This failure to 
15. See, e.g., Mississippi State Employment Security Comm'n v. Jackson, 237 Miss. 
897, ll6 So. 2d 830 (1960); Philco Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Dd. of Re• 
view, 175 Pa. Super. 402, 105 A.2d 176 (1954); Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 
Pa. Super. 36, 63 A.2d 429 (1949). 
16. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.48 (Supp. 1961). 
17. See, e.g., Shadowens Unemployment Compensation Case, 177 Pa. Super. 49, 
110 A.2d 258 (1954); Mattey Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Super. 36, 
63 A.2d 429 (1949); cf. Adams v. Review Dd. of the Ind. Employment Security Div,, 
237 Ind. 63, 143 N.E.2d 564 (1957). 
18. See Schettino v. Administrator, 138 Conn. 253, 261, 83 A.2d 217, 221 (1951): 
"to be 'available for work' .•• [does not] necessarily mean available for some other 
work than the [former] employer's." Accord, Golubski Unemployment Compensation 
Case, 171 Pa. Super. 634, 91 A.2d 315 (1952). 
19. All states disqualify an employee who has left work voluntarily without good 
cause; twenty-four states have now restricted this to good cause connected with the 
work or attributable to the employer. See generally BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
op. cit. supra note 5. 
20. See, e.g., Beaman v. Dench, 75 Ariz. 345, 256 P.2d 721 (1953); Bridges v. Cavalier 
Corp., 212 Tenn. 237, 369 S.W.2d 548 (1963); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Amlin, 
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follow the statutory language appears to be based on the courts' in-
ability to discern the intended meaning of "good cause attributable 
to the employer."21 Without specific legislative guidance, the courts 
have been greatly influenced by a general policy statement, contained 
in the unemployment act of every state, that a public purpose of un-
employment compensation is to provide relief for "involuntary un-
employment."22 In fact, this over-emphasis on voluntariness has been 
encouraged by commentators who suggest that the unemployment 
compensation program is basically insurance legislation23 and that 
sound actuarial principles of insurance dictate that recovery of ben-
efits should not be allowed when the unemployment is voluntary.24 
"Voluntary" 
Since the courts have generally disregarded the "good cause" 
provision, their decisions in cases involving required vacation with-
out pay have been based on their interpretation of the term "volun-
tary." The earliest decisions all held that any employee who gave 
his employer the contractual right to close the plant was voluntarily 
unemployed and could not receive unemployment compensation.25 
161 Tex. 606, 343 S.W.2d 249 (1961); In the Matter of the Employees of Buffelen 
Lumber &: Mfg. Co., 32 Wash. 2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948). 
21. See Flournoy v. Brown, 140 So. 2d 729 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Dawkins Unem-
ployment Compensation Cases, 358 Pa. 224, 56 A.2d 254 (1948). Generally, the courts 
have found "good cause attributable to the employer" only when the employer has 
obviously endangered the employee's health, Department of Indus. Relations v. Chap-
man, 37 Ala. App. 680, 74_ So. 2d 621 (1954), or physical well-being, Rafferty v. Iowa 
Employment Secu::lty Comm'n, 247 Iowa 896, 76 N.W.2d 787 (1956), or when the 
employee was fired, Intertown Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 328 
Mich. 363, 43 N.W.2d 888 (1950). In one case, however, the court held that there was 
"good cause attributable to the employer" when work conditions were substantially 
less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the locality. Brown· v. Brown, 
153 So. 2d 190 (La. Ct. App. 1963). In states where the good cause need not necessarily 
be attributable to the employer or employing unit, the_ courts have given the pro-
vision a somewhat wider application. See, e.g., Filchock Unemployment Compensation 
Case, 164 Pa. Super. 43, 63 A.2d 355 (1949). But see Woodmen of the World Life Ins. 
Soc'y v. Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N.W.2d 923 (1942). 
22, This policy statement originally appeared in the Draft Bills for State Unem-
ployment Compensation of the Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Type, 
issued by the Federal Social Security Board, Jan. 1, 1936, revised Sept. 1936. Large 
portions of these bills, which were intended to serve as models for the state unem-
ployment compensation provisions, were in fact incorporated into most state acts. See 
generally Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits, 55 YALE L.J. 117, BS 
~~ . 
23. See, e.g., Young, Employment Security in Michigan-Procedure and Practice, 
38 Mich. S.B.J., Feb. 1959, pp. 31, 32: "The act is neither a welfare nor charity 
program; it is in the nature of an insurance program; its tax and benefits provisions 
are based an actuarial principles." 
24. See PA'ITERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 221 (2d ed. 1957): "[I]t is implied 
in every insurance contract that the insured event is a fortuitous one, i.e., one not 
designedly brought about by the insured." 
25. E.g., Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz. 345, 256 P.2d 721 (1953); Moen v. Director of 
the Div. of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N.E.2d 779 (1949); Jackson v. 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W .2d 449 (1951); In the 
Matter of the Employees of Buffelen Lumber&: Mfg. Co., 32 Wash. 2d 205, 201 P.2d 
194 (1948). 
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More recent decisions, however, indicate a greater awareness of the 
plight of the "captive worker," who finds upon obtaining work that 
he is "bound ... under union and company agreements contracted 
without his knowledge, participation or consent."26 As a result, 
courts have begun to scrutinize more carefully the provisions of the 
collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the unem-
ployment should, in fact, be deemed "voluntary." For example, sev-
eral courts have differentiated between collective bargaining agree-
. ments which require the employer to close and those which merely 
permit him to do so. Recovery has never been granted in the former 
situation,27 but has in the latter because the agreement leaves the 
final decision to close entirely to the employer.28 Recovery has also 
been allowed because the employer, after promising to try to find 
work for employees while the plant was closed, was unsuccessful in 
his efforts.29 The court found that because the employer failed to 
find work, the employees were "involuntarily" unemployed. 
Although these distinctions have given the courts a means of grant-
ing recovery in cases where they have apparently felt strongly that 
recovery should be allowed, 30 the validity of the distinctions seems 
questionable. It would appear difficult to consider an employee's un-
employment more "voluntary" simply because the collective bargain-
ing agreement requires his employer to shut down rather than provid-
ing that he may shut down. Similarly, it is difficult to understand the 
relevance of a promise by the employer to find temporary employment 
to the voluntary acceptance by the employee of a condition in his 
employment contract requiring a vacation shutdown. Apparently, 
the courts have once again been confused by a legislative declara-
tion of policy-that benefits are intended for persons unemployed 
26. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n v. Appeal Bd. of the Mich. Employ-
ment Security Comm'n, 1959 BENEFIT SERIES SERVICE-UNEMPLOYMENT INS. § TPU 80.2-
87, -88 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1958). See generally cases cited notes 28 and 29 infra. 
27. See Bridges v. Cavalier Corp., 212 Tenn. 237, 244, 369 S.W.2d !HS, 551 (1963), 
where the court stated that for recovery to be allowed in such a case, "it is up to the 
legislature to change the terms or form of the act to meet such a holding." Accord, 
Adams v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Security Div., 237 Ind. 63, 143 N.E,2d 
564 (1957); Shadowens Unemployment Compensation Case, 1'77 Pa. Super. 49, 110 A,2d 
258 (19p4). 
28. Dahman v. Commercial Shearing &: Stamping Co., 1'10 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio C.P. 
1960); Piestrak Unemployment Compensation Case, 404 Pa. 52'7, 172 A.2d 807 (1961); 
Texas Employment Comm'n v. Amlin, 161 Te.x. 606, 343 S.'W .2d 249 (1961); General 
Time Corp. v. Cummins, 1957 BENEFIT SERIES SERVICE-UNEMPLOYMENT INS, § TPU 
80.2-75 (1955), affd, Ill. Cir. Ct., 1956 (unreported). But see In the Matter of Invin, 9 
App. Div. 2d 352, 193 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1959); Bridges v. Cavalier Corp., 212 Tenn. 23'7, 369 
S.W.2d 548 (1963). · 
29. Yobe v. Shenvin-Williams Co., 1954 BENEFIT SERIES SERVICE-UNEMPLOYMENT 
!Ns. § TPU 80.15-2'7 (Ohio C.P.). 
30. See, e.g., American Bridge Co. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Security 
Div., 121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951); Teichler v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 24 
N.J. 585, 133 A.2d 320 (1957); Dahman v. Commercial Shearing &: Stamping Co., 1'70 
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio C.P. 1960); Yobe v. Sherwin-Williams Co., supra note 29; Bennett v. 
Hix, 139 W. Va. 75, '79 S.E.2d 114 (1953). 
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"through no fault of their own."31 Thus, by viewing vacation-shut-
down cases in terms of "fault," some courts have come to the illog-
ical conclusion that no separation from employment is compensable 
unless it is traceable to fault on the part of the employer.82 Even 
the courts which have recognized that there is no statutory basis for 
such a conclusion have continued to seek at least some unilateral ac-
tion by the employer attributable entirely to his volition33 or ·wrong-
doing before they will grant recovery.34 
Because of the pervasive notion of fault, no court has been will-
ing to expand the concept of "involuntariness" far enough to en-
compass the situation in which the collective bargaining agreement 
clearly states that the plant must close for vacation, since such a con-
tract .leaves the employer no option.35 It appears, however, that 
courts may soon be willing to go this far, even in the absence of em-
ployer culpability. Three decisions not involving vacation shutdowns 
have held that a collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant in de-
termining whether unemployment is voluntary.36 Furthermore, the 
prevailing judicial attitude is that "voluntary" connotes intended, if 
not necessarily desired, consequences.37 This required finding of em-
ployee intent is difficult to locate if a union negotiates a contract 
provision neither of the employee's making nor of his liking. Thus, 
some courts may soon abandon their tenuous factual distinctions and 
hold that all employees who are ineligible for vacation pay while 
their plants are closed are involuntarily unemployed and eligible for 
benefits. 
Such a conclusion would ignore the realities of the collective 
bargaining process. The negotiations between unions and manage-
ment result in what the United States Supreme Court has called a 
"trade agreement, rather than ... a contract of employment."38 
31. This policy statement appeared in the Draft Bills for State Unemployment 
Compensation. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
32. See Gatewood v. Iowa Iron &: Metal Co., 251 Iowa 639, 102 N.W.2d 146 (1960); 
John Morrell&: Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 69 S.D. 618, 13 N.W.2d 
498 (1944). 
33. See cases cited note 28 supra. 
34. See Yobe v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 1954 BENEFIT SERIES SERVICE-UNEMl'LOY-
MENT INS. § TPU 80.15-27 (Ohio C.P .). 
35. See cases cited note 27 supra. 
36. See Douglas Aircraft Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 180 
Cal. App. 2d 636, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Myerson v. Board of Review, 
43 N.J. Super. 196, 128 A.2d 15 (1957); Smith Unemployment Compensation Case, 396 
Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492 (1959). These cases all involved women whose collective bar-
gaining contracts required them to leave work upon reaching a certain stage of 
pregnancy. In allowing recovery, all three courts held that the collective bargaining 
agreement was not a factor in determining whether the women left work voluntarily. 
37. See Olechnicky v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 325 Mass. 660, 
92 N.E.2d 252 (1950); MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Bel. of Review, 
158 Pa. Super. 418, 45 A.2d 423 (1946). See generally Sanders, Disqualification for Un-
employment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REv. 307, 317-18 (1955). 
38. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944). 
1606 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64 
This agreement by itself gives rise to no rights or obligations;30 
these can result only from the individual contract between employer 
and employee.40 Although an employee may be forced to accept the 
terms of a previously negotiated contract or lose his job, his agree-
ment to the contract is not thereby made any less "voluntary." Con-
sequently, there appears to be no justification for courts to increase 
the scope of unemployment compensation by expanding the concept 
of "involuntary" unemployment. 
Vulcan 
Although it does not resolve the problem of statutory uncer• 
tainty, a recent Michigan Supreme Court decision, Employment Se-
curity Comm'n v. Vulcan Forging Co.,41 has arrived at a more log-
ical way of granting recovery in these cases. In Vulcan the collective 
bargaining agreement clearly stated that there would be a shutdown 
for vacations and that employees with less than a year's seniority 
would receive no vacation pay.42 Nevertheless, the court held that 
even if these employees were off work voluntarily because they had 
accepted the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the action 
of the employer in closing the plant pursuant to the agreement was 
"good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit." Ap-
parently, the court based its reasoning on the idea that the unem-
ployment resulted from a contract between two parties-employer 
and employee-and that the necessary and intended consequences 
of the contract (the temporary closing) are voluntary consequences 
vis-a-vis the employee, since they can be attributed directly to his 
voluntary action in making the contract. However, by a "parity of 
reasoning," the same consequences can be attributed just as readily 
to the employer or employing unit for its voluntary action in making 
the contract. The final _result of the employer's voluntary action is 
what the court finds to be "good cause" for the temporary unem-
ployment.43 
The court's decision in Vulcan reflects an awareness of two basic 
39. Ibid. 
40. This does not necessarily require a signed document or even verbal agreement. 
In large companies, acceptance by the employee is usually implied from his continued 
service. Likewise, he may manifest his refusal of the contract conditions by quitting 
work. 
41. 375 Mich. 374, 134 N.W.2d 749 (1965). Vulcan overruled prior state law. In 
I. M. Dach Underwear Co. v. Employment Security Comm'n, 347 Mich. 465, 80 N.W.2d 
193 (1956), the court had held that employees unemployed and unpaid during a plant 
shutdown for vacations were not entitled to unemployment compensation because 
they were not "involuntarily unemployed." The court did not consider the "good 
cause" provision in Dach. 
42. Section 64 of the contract provided: "Employee must be on seniority list on 
July 1 of the vacation year to be eligible for vacation pay •••• Plant will close for 
vacation period of one or two weeks during July or August •••• " 
43. Employment Security Comm'n v. Vulcan Forging Co., 375 Mich. 374, 380, 134 
N.W.2d 749, 752-53 (1965). 
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realities about the statutory language. First, it seems to recognize 
that, notwithstanding sound insurance principles, state unemploy-
ment compensation provisions do not prevent a man who has left 
work voluntarily from receiving unemployment compensation unless 
he has also left "without good cause attributable to the employer or 
employing unit." Second, the decision recognizes that the disqualifi-
cation section neither mentions fault nor contains any provision re-
quiring that an employee prove employer culpability.44 Yet, while 
the parity of reasoning used in Vulcan may provide a more satisfac-
tory basis for a result which many courts now consider desirable, 
it also serves to magnify the inadequacy of the statutory language. 
The argument simply recognizes that unemployment based on a 
contract cannot be attributed to only one contracting party. What 
is voluntary action by the one can logically be considered "good 
cause" attributable to the other. Under this line of reasoning, there 
cannot be a situation where unemployment based on the contract 
is voluntary, but without good cause attributable to the employer 
or employing unit. Ho~ever, it is doubtful that any court will be 
willing to grant recovery in every case in which unemployment re-
sults from a contractual arrangement.46 
Legislative Clarification Needed 
The need for legislative clarification of the benefit rights of the 
worker whose contract requires an unpaid vacation is clear. A num-
ber of states have already recognized this need and have enacted 
specific statutory provisions dealing with the problem. Although a 
few of the provisions have disqualified employees,46 the majority of 
these provisions have expressly excluded them from the operation 
of the disqualification section.47 On the whole, the latter provisions 
44. West Virginia is the only state in which the disqualification provision for 
voluntary leaving is couched in terms of fault or wrongdoing. W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 2366('18)(1) (Supp. 1965) declares that an employee is disqualified if he left work 
"voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer." How-
ever, West Virginia has also enacted a statutory provision to protect the worker on 
vacation without pay, unless his employer had "no other alternative" than to shut 
down. See W. VA. ConE ANN. § 2366('18)(9) (Supp. 1965). 
45. See In re Malaspina's Claim, 309 N.Y. 413, 131 N.E.2d '109 (1956); Lybarger 
Unemployment Compensation Case, 418 Pa. 4'11, 211 A.2d 463 (1965); O'Donnell v. 
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 1'13 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d 406 (1953). 
46. Two states have enacted provisions which explicitly disqualify the employee. 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-'1'15(4) (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 60-46 (Supp. 1964). Two 
others have greatly limited the period for which he can recover. GA. ConE ANN. 
§ 54-609(c) (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-13(3) (Supp. 1965). 
47. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 440 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); ME. REv. STAT, ANN. 
tit. 26, § 1192(3) (1964); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 4(c) (1964); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 151A, § l(r)(2) (195'1); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 591; Omo REv. CODE ANN, §§ 4141.29(D)(2), 
.3l(A)('1) (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § '153(u) (1964). Some states allow recovery 
unless the vacation shutdown is the result of the employee's own action rather than 
a result of collective bargaining. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-627(2) (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43.21-4(c) (1962); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 28-44-2l(a) (1956). 
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seem to be based on sounder policy considerations. In the first place, 
they eradicate distinctions based solely· on the terms of collective bar-
gaining contracts. At the present time, in most states an employee 
whose plant customarily suspends operations for an unpaid vacation 
or layoff each year can receive unemployment compensation if, but 
usually only if, the suspension is not designated in his collective bar-
gaining agreement.48 While none of the workers has sought the 
shutdown, they all know that their temporary unemployment will 
occur. Furthermore, the plants close not in an attempt to benefit the 
employees, but for reasons dictated basically by the employer's de-
sire for efficient production. Consequently, the present distinctions 
based on provisions in collective bargaining agreements seem to 
serve no purpose and should be removed. Second, the provisions 
give a measure of financial security to workers who might other-
wise begin a job only to find themselves temporarily off work 
without even the income they might have had if they had remained 
on unemployment relief. Third, such provisions give needed protec-
tion to the bargaining interests of employees who are not safeguarded 
by the seniority system. As noted earlier, vacation pay is generally 
based on the length of an employee's service; while employees with 
seniority receive almost full wages, employees hired within the past 
year are often totally ignored by the union and company bargaining 
agents. Employers will not be able to continue to ignore the inter-
ests of these employees, however, if they are receiving unemployment 
benefits, since unemployment compensation is financed in all states 
by employer contributions.49 Each employer contributes a percent- . 
age of the wages he has paid to employees during the year to the 
state unemployment fund. This percentage is flexible, and is deter-
mined by the total amount of unemployment benefits paid to work-
ers who have become or have remained attached to the labor market 
through service with the particular employer. Consequently, the fi. 
nancial loss suffered by the employer depends on his ability to keep 
his workers from becoming unemployed and eligible for benefits. 
From the employer's standpoint, legislation allowing employees 
unemployment compensation during vacations may seem unduly 
burdensome. If the employer denies vacation pay, he must pay indi-
rectly for unemployment benefits. If he attempts to give new em-
ployees a paid vacation, he may destroy some of the incentive of the 
seniority system, and may not be able to persuade union bargaining 
agents to accept such a provision. He would also be faced with the 
possibility of employees accepting a job just for the vacation, and 
then quitting rather than returning to work at the end of the vaca-
48. See cases cited in notes 10, 11, 8: 27 supra. 
49. Several states also collect from employees. There are numerous differences 
among the provisions in each of the states. See BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LAlloR, COMl'ARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAws 17-46 (1964). 
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tion period. Furthermore, the employer gets no benefit from the 
money he is required to pay into the state unemployment compen-
sation fund. Nevertheless, an annual unpaid vacation shutdown ap-
pears to be the type of industrial condition against which the unem-
ployment compensation act was designed to protect the employee. 
The shutdmvn is generally not sought by the employee, but is rather 
a device used by the employer to increase production efficiency. Were 
it not for the decreased efficiency, the employer could simply stagger 
vacations and allow the employees not entitled to vacation to work 
during the entire year. Consequently, the shutdown may be deemed 
attributable to "economic causes."50 
In addition, such legislation would allow a practical solution 
which is beneficial both to the employer and the employee. Since 
shutdmvns are usually times for general maintenance work, the 
employer may be able to avoid the effect of the recommended 
legislation by giving the new employees an opportunhy to work 
during the vacation shutdown. Of course, complaints might be 
registered by senior employees who also want to continue work-
ing. Furthermore, there will be instances in which no work is 
available or when union contracts prevent production workers from 
performing maintenance work. If these difficulties cannot be over-
come, such a solution is probably infeasible. Usually, however, the 
companies that close for vacation have small factories without large 
maintenance crews. Since the number of new employees in such fac-
tories is customarily small, these companies should be able to pro-
vide most or all of their new employees with unskilled maintenance 
work while production operations are closed. By providing the new 
employees with this work, employers can receive beneficial service 
for their money' and can avoid the unsatisfactory alternatives of fi-
nancing unemployment compensation or attempting to grant all em-
ployees vacation pay. 
Conclusion 
Despite the recent judicial trend toward granting unemployment 
benefits to workers for periods of required vacation without pay, the 
ability of an employee to recover in any given situation still remains. 
uncertain. Since the statutes have generally not been drafted with 
this problem in mind, the courts have been forced to draw distinc-
tions which are difficult to justify under the statutory language. Fur-
thermore, their conclusions lack a sound policy basis. To serve best 
the policies of the unemployment compensation acts and to give 
needed protection to the interests of the employee, all states should 
enact legislation permitting eligible workers to recover unemploy-
ment compensation while their plant is temporarily closed pursuant 
to a collective bargaining agreement. 
50. See authorities cited note 6 supra. 
